Στιγμιότυπα της Ελληνικής Ιστορίας μέσα από αναφορές της CIA.
The President’s intelligence checklist
Central Intelligence Agency
20 Οκτωβρίου 1947
The current situation in Greece
1. Strategic importance of Greece
Greece is the last Balkan state resisting Soviet domination. Should the USSR obtain control of Greece directly or through the satellites, the USSR would: a) complete its domination of the Balkans; b) be able to extend and consolidate the position in the Aegean which control of Macedonia and Thrace would give the Soviet Union; c) secure Salonica, historical southern terminus of the land route from the Danubian Basin; and g) gain a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking Turkey and the Dardanelles, threatening the Suez, and endangering the polities of the Near East.
In recognition of these facts the Greek-Turkish aid bill was formulated. The extension of aid to Greece and Turkey was the first clear announcement to the world at large that the United States intended to help and support those countries which resisted Soviet encroachment. The continued ability of Greece to resist with US aid will therefore be closely watched by both the Eastern and Western blocs and will have an important influence on the future success of US foreign policy in Europe and the Near East.
While Greece has had many forms of government, the great majority of the Greeks have remained highly individualistic and have a strong sense of political freedom. Today among the leaders of both the Right and the Left there is a strong tendency, born of fear, towards extreme politics. Were Greece given guarantee of national independence, the vast center elements in the country would again be able to assert their democratic principles and would be able to give constructive support to the Western democracies and the United Nations.
Militarily Greece could not withstand an attack by a major power or by a combination of the Balkan satellites. Its independence and the continued security of its important strategic points can at the moment be guaranteed only by the United States.
2. Probable future developments
In the over-all strategic plans for the Near East, a top priority objective of the USSR is to take control of Greece, through the Balkan satellites, the Greek Communists, or both. Should complete realization of the objective fail, Yugoslavia may attempt to detach Greek or “Aegean” Macedonia for incorporation, along with Yugoslav Macedonia, as a state in a federated Yugoslavia. Detachment of Macedonia would be accompanied by detachment of Thrace by Bulgaria.
To accomplish its ends in Greece, the USSR will continue to: a) disseminate propaganda to discredit Greek government; b) attempt to block every effort of the UN to solve the Greek problem; c) attempt, through guerilla sabotage and destruction, to cripple the Greek national economy and nullify the American Aid Program; and d) furnish clandestine aid to the guerillas through the satellites. The USSR may even extend recognition to the “democratic” army and eventually to the “free” Greek government in opposition to the Athens government.
The extent to which Greece can counter the tactics of the satellites and the USSR depends most immediately on the ability of the army to subdue the guerillas. During the winter of 1946-47, the creation of a broadly representative and sincere government in Athens could have done much to stop the internecine strife; now, however, the general situation has so deteriorated and the Communists have become so determined that, although a majority coalition Populist-Liberal government has been formed (7 September 1947), a purely political solution of Greece’s troubles is not probable.
So long as the war continues, with the wholesale destruction and paralyzing fear which it creates, there can be no real social and economic reconstruction. Originally, some $149 million of the $300 million appropriated by the US to aid Greece was earmarked for military needs from the funds allotted to economic reconstruction.
With increased US equipment and more vigorous leadership, the army should be able to subdue the local Greek guerillas. However, army leadership is still inadequate for the task at hand, and the guerillas are receiving aid in men and material on an increasing scale from the satellites. Under these circumstances, the Greek Army, as presently constituted and employed, cannot accomplish its mission and the Greek people, weary, terrorized, and without effective leadership, can do little to help themselves.
Thus, the future of Greece rests with the USSR and the US. It is not likely that the USSR and the satellites will relax their tremendous pressure on Greece, or that the American Aid Program will have sufficiently revived the morale and economy of the country by June 1948 for Greece to stand alone. If the Greek government cooperates honestly and energetically, the Program may keep Greece afloat until that time provided the USSR and its satellites do not overtly intervene; for some time thereafter the survival of Greece as an independent country will depend on how much and what kind of aid is forthcoming from the US.
3. Political situation
Chronic political instability in Greece has, since liberation, been aggravated by widespread Communist activities. Moreover, even in the face of national disaster, many politicians in Athens have refused to surrender their personal and party interests for the common good. It is doubtful whether the present government, although a coalition of the two largest parties, has the full confidence of a majority of the people. Without firm US guidance, the conflict of ideas and of personalities within the cabinet may make the government ineffectual.
While the government operates under a liberal and enlightened constitution, chaotic conditions and terror have resulted in many extreme measures and inconsistencies in the administration. Thus, while for a long time the Communist Party and press were allowed legal operation, the government has jailed or exiled hundreds of non-Communists simply because they were members of the political opposition. The seditious Communist press has now been closed down. Political injustices against the non-Communist opposition continue, though on a rapidly decreasing scale.
In 1946 the people rallied behind the Rightist Populist (Royalist) Party out of fear of the Communists. Continued blunders by the reactionaries, however, shook the people’s belief in the Rightists’ ability to cope with the Communist problem. American representatives in Greece, recognizing this situation, were from time to time able to bring about a broadening of the government. No really effective coalition has yet been formed, however. The Centrists, who normally represent the predominant political sentiment of the country, have been politically frustrated through a combination of external pressures; consequently, despite the fact that the present government is headed by a Liberal prime minister, the tenacious, perennial politicians of the Right still have a controlling voice.
Most non-Communist leaders agree that the chief task of the government is to eliminate the Communist threat, but many take violent issue over the method by which the guerillas can be defeated and the country set on the road to economic recovery. Most politicians, realizing the vital necessity of American aid to Greece, accede to US suggestions concerning recovery; others still attempt to exploit the situation and the American Aid Program for their own political ends.
The large majority of Greek people are democratic and pro-Anglo-American; they fear the USSR and hate the Greek Communists who have conducted a ruthless campaign of terror in the countryside. Given assurance of hope and stability through American aid, the people should eventually be able to reaffirm their democratic principles; given continued fear and hopelessness, the will succumb, however unwillingly, to the persistent pressure of the determined, militant Communists.
4. Economic situation
Greece has always been a poor nation with one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. World War II, enemy occupation, and continuing guerilla strife have further damaged Greece’s chronically precarious economy, and since liberation a bare subsistence level has been maintained only through foreign relief shipments. Natural resources and industry are under-developed, and agricultural methods are antiquated. Food and consumer goods are scarce, prices are high, the currency is inflated, unemployment is widespread, and business morale is low. Although a large-scale reconstruction of transportation and port facilities is beginning, roads and railroads continue to suffer damage from guerilla action.
While the Greek economy is primarily agricultural, only 20 per cent of the land is arable, and the soil is suited mainly for specialty crops which are exported to pay for imports of basic foodstuffs. An infant light industry normally supplies 80 per cent of the country’s manufactured consumers goods but is dependent on imports for most raw materials, machinery and fuel. A flourishing merchant marine currently contributes little to the Greek economy because of the practice of registering ships in foreign countries and investing earnings abroad. Inadequate transportation hampers internal communications and distribution of foodstuffs. The rivers of Greece are a potential power supply, but their development would require large capital investment and a considerable period of time.
Funds for military supplies and for reconstruction have been obtained from foreign sources. The American Aid Program, which has undertaken to meet needs for the period May 1947 through June 1948, depends for its success in restoring economic stability on carefully planned control of all important phases of Greek economic life and on a speedy restoration of internal military security by the Greek Army.
So far, failure of the army has not only delayed recovery but has also necessitated a transfer of money allotted for reconstruction to military needs. Furthermore, the damage to this year’s promising grain crop caused by drought and guerilla action has also necessitated transfer of funds from reconstruction to relief.
While at the present time Greek economic survival is completely dependent on direct US aid (and is likely to continue so regardless of the Marshal Plan), it is probable that continued civil war will prevent national reconstruction within the time limit of the American Aid Program.
5. Foreign affairs
Greek foreign policy, beginning shortly after liberation, has of necessity been a defensive policy against the expansionism of the Balkan satellites (which have traditionally sought an outlet to the Aegean) adopted an offensive policy toward Greece. The press and radio in these countries and in the USSR repeatedly attacked the Greek Government, and finally Tito boldly announced that Yugoslavs “could not remain indifferent” to the fate of their brothers in “Aegean Macedonia”. By the end of 1946, the satellites, although following the outward forms of normal diplomatic relations with the Greek Government, were blatantly aiding the Greek insurgents materially as well as morally.
Greece has traditionally depended on Great Britain as the great sea power in the Mediterranean to maintain its independence and to bolster its economy with national loans and capital investments. With the retrenchment of the British in the Near East, however, the US has assumed major commitments in Greece. The Greeks have thereby become economically dependent on the US, to which they have long been oriented sentimentally. A violent Soviet propaganda program against US intervention in Greek affairs does not widely affect US-Greek relations, and so long as the Soviet threat exists, Greece will cooperate with and follow the lead of the US.
6. Military situation
The effective reconstruction of Greece depends immediately on the ability of the army to eliminate the guerilla forces. Yet after seven months of the anti-guerilla campaign which started in April, the guerillas are numerically stronger than ever before and the situation has reached what might be called a deteriorating stalemate.
At the beginning of 1947 the resurgent guerillas, by forcing the villagers to flee to large towns, by destroying villages, and by cutting lines of communication, were paralyzing national recovery. An under-trained army was therefore forced to begin operations against the bands, which were receiving concrete support from the satellites in the form of men and material. The strategy planned by the General Staff was to clear individual areas of guerillas and then to seal the northern border of Greece to prevent re-infiltration from the satellite countries. Tactically it was planned for field units to surround single areas, thereby preventing escape to other areas, and then to crush the trapped guerillas. In both strategy and tactics the army has failed. Some of this failure lies with the army itself –a defensive rather than an offensive spirit, bad timing, the use of field methods in mountain warfare; but the chief causes of failure have been inadequate troops, terrain
which favors highly mobile bands not committed to defend given points, and, in the border areas, the ability of the guerillas to slip to safety in the satellite countries.
Until July 1947, the guerillas contented themselves with evasive action, but since then there have been occasions on which they have attempted to stand and defend certain areas, probably as a test of the feasibility of protecting a “free” government should one be established on Greek soil.
The guerillas number some 18,500. Well over half of them are forced recruits, but they are effectively held by threat of death or of reprisals to their families. The hard core of the guerillas, probably about 20 per cent, are determined, are effectively led by officers thoroughly familiar with the local terrain, and are encouraged, advised, and aided by the satellites. Their principal of operation is one of destruction and terror to produce the greatest amount of chaos possible.
Operating against the guerillas is an army of 120,000, temporarily increased by 20,000 recruits inducted to permit the release of a similar number of veterans. The efficiency of the army high command is decreased by involvement in politics. The lower echelons are affected by lack of training and initiative, and by over-dispersion which prevents the marshalling of a sufficient concentrated striking force. The army initially held a temporary advantage over the guerillas by virtue of air support. This advantage has now been greatly reduced by increasingly effective air defense on the part of the guerillas and by pilot fatigue and low morale in the air force. The UK’s decision to withdraw its remaining troops from Greece before the end of 1947 will have an adverse effect on Greek morale, for although the troops have not participated in the guerilla fighting, their presence has been reassuring to the Greek Army and the government.
The military stalemate might be broken in several ways: a) a shakeup in the General Stuff -on 23 October, the Prime Minister approved certain changes in the General Stuff the effect of which cannot yet be determined- which, coupled with US aid in material and advice in tactics, may enable the army to assume an effective offensive; b) more overt aid by the satellites in the form of heavier weapons and of international brigades which at the most would defeat the army and at the least would force Greek morale and economy to a breaking point; c) overt participation by actual satellite units which would result in defeat of the army and loss of northern Greece. The last of these possibilities is not likely at this time; the Kremlin appears satisfied with the present disruptive effort in Greece and probably does not need to risk further world censure. Most probably the destructive stalemate will continue; if so, the American Aid Program will be rendered ineffective, and no appreciable recovery will have been accomplished by June 1948, when the program expires.
25 Ιουλίου 1959
The Greek Government is expressing fears of severe internal political and economic repercussions if its application for association with the European Common Market (EEC) is not approved at the EEC meeting scheduled for 25 July. While members of the Common Market generally favor Greek association, affirmative action on the application may be delayed for some time. There is concern that acceptance of the special Greek terms for membership would set an undesirable precedent, and a belief that acceptance of Greece at this time might hinder development of an eventual multi-lateral European economic association.
4 Ιανουαρίου 1962
Greece, seeing an opportunity in Albania’s pariah status, is working hard to extend its influence there...
15 Ιανουαρίου 1962
Greece’s... pessimistic over future US defense aid, reportedly has called for a cut in the present level of Greek military expenditures.
31 Μαρτίου 1962
Greek Foreign Minister Averoff expects the USSR to step up its propaganda attacks against Greece which may reach a peak during the May NATO meeting in Athens, wich is already the subject of Bloc complaints.
10 Ιουνίου 1963
A disagreement between Prime Minister Karamanlis and King Paul has blown up to the point that...
If both men stick to their guns, new elections will be necessary with the likelihood of less stable government for Greece in the future.
22 Οκτωβρίου 1963
The sharp clashes last week between left-wing elements and the Athens police were instigated by the Communist-dominated United Democratic Party in the hopes of provoking strong police measures. The party’s aim, of course, is to discredit the 3 November elections as a “legalized fraud”.
28 Νοεμβρίου 1963
It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.
His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis party on the right or from the Communists.
The military has let it be known that it would consider Papandreou’s acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d’ etat.
Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intents to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.
This would then open the way for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.
21 Δεκεμβρίου 1963
The tangled political situation has resulted in postponement of the vote of confidence for Prime Minister Papandreou, but it will still come by Christmas.
20 Νοεμβρίου 1964
The Turkish military is once again warning that war with Greece is a distinct possibility if Ankara’s demands are not met. Though apparently emboldened by Soviet support for its position on Cyprus, we doubt that the Inonu government would authorize an attack against Greece in the absence of some new onslaught on the Turkish Cypriots or a sudden move to effect enosis.
21 Φεβρουαρίου 1964
Embassy Athens reports the new cabinet to be a moderate one.
Papandreou has allayed suspicion that he would appoint extremists to key positions. In so doing he may have mollified the concern of the army and palace over his decisive victory.
With King Paul out of action, Papandreou’s relations with the palace may be another story. There is no love lost between him and the Queen.
Embassy Athens thinks it significant that the new premier plans to discuss Cyprus with Makarios’ rival general Grivas. Papandreou may be trying to make good on his assurances that he would do his best to calm down the Greek extremists on the island.
Nothing concrete has emerged from the rumors of a “summit meeting” between Papandreou and Inonu.
The feeling in Ankara seems to be that such a meeting would require a lot of preparation in order to have any chance of success.
28 Ιουλίου 1965
The outlook is murky as the political struggle moves toward a climax.
The ruling Center Union Party is scheduled to caucus tomorrow prior to the reopening of parliament Friday. No clear favorite has emerged among the three main contenders-Novas, Stephanopoulos, and Papandreou.
The Novas government has handled itself well, but it does not seem to have attracted the needed votes. Stephanopoulos is still a possible compromise candidate but has been wishy-washy in standing up to Papandreou. The latter has managed to hang on to significant backing through a mixture of threats and cajolery.
However the party decision goes, the parliamentary session that follows promises to be a stormy one with good chances for disturbances both on the floor and in the streets.
Meanwhile, the political crisis is further aggravating strains on the always shaky Greek economy.
30 Αυγούστου 1965
The King is weighing his next move following the failure of Tsirimokos to win a vote of confidence.
The King is not likely to be attracted to Papandreou’s proposal which calls for elections in mid-November with a service government running the country in the interim. The King would prefer a much longer cooling off period before an election takes place in which the monarchy could be an issue.
He may instead try to install a government of nonpolitical technicians or a coalition of all political parties.
Considering, however, that the area of possible compromise has been narrowed in the past few weeks, it is possible that the King may choose to play his trump card now rather than later. This would be to turn to the military for a solution.
21 Σεπτεμβρίου 1965
Parliament reconvenes tomorrow and it now appears that Premier-designate Stephanopoulos will make the grade. Balloting on a vote of confidence, however, is not expected until late Friday.
Today, two more Center Union deputies abandoned the Papandreou camp in favor of the new government. This will give Stephanopoulos command of 152 of the 300 seats in Parliament if he can prevent redefections.
Papandreou forces will probably resume demonstrations throughout the country in a last minute effort to reverse the trend.
28 Μαρτίου 1967
A new political crisis may be brewing in the perennial feud between the King and ex-premier Papandreou. The King has replaced two career senior officers who are in the Papandreou camp. Papandreou may retaliate with an effort to topple the present “interim” government.
1 Απριλίου 1967
There has been a parade of political leaders to the palace, but so far no one has been named to form a new government.
20 Απριλίου 1967
The government may be getting ready to arrest left-wing leader Andreas Papandreou, the ex-premier’s son.
26 Απριλίου 1967
The country’s new rulers clearly expect to be around for some time.
Official pronouncements reflect a strongly “reformist” mission and a distaste for professional politicians.
King Constantine now seem intent on exerting whatever influence he can toward moderation.
1 Μαΐου 1967
There are still no signs of an effective opposition to the military takeover, but deep concern about the future is developing in Athens. The talk both in liberal and conservative circles is that the coup could well produce a permanent split between left and right- a situation which could work to the best advantage of the Communists.
16 Δεκεμβρίου 1967
The junta seems willing, or even eager, to have the King return. The colonels probably feel his presence would lend a needed aura of legitimacy to their regime.
Various emissaries are en route to Rome to see the King, and presumably to convey the junta’s conditions for his return. Constantine says he will not return unless the junta at least fixes a date for a constitutional referendum.
20 Αυγούστου 1968
The embassy comments that the Greek regime has been shaken and sobered but not panicked by the attempt last week on the life of Papadopoulos. Its internal strength is undiminished and its position vis-a-vis Andreas Papandreou has probably been improved. The government apparently intends to hold the constitutional referendum on schedule—29 September. Former political leaders in Greece seem to recognize that there is no alternative to approving the constitution and then, hopefully, moving on to general elections.
13 Ιανουαρίου 1968
Ambassador Talbot reports that the junta leaders have reached the explosion point over what they consider refusal of their NATO allies to do business with them.
On Thursday interior Minister Pattakos complained bitterly to an embassy officer that the “attitude” of the US and other NATO countries is creating uncertainty among the Greek people. ...
Later that night, Papadopoulos was slightly more restrained during a long talk with the Ambassador. Papadopoulos nevertheless insisted there is no valid reason for US refusal to continue formal relations. He threatened to announce within a week that “NATO had rejected Greece.”
The junta has been hot under the collar over alleged US coolness ever since the April takeover. The vehemence of these recent remarks suggests some troublesome public statement may in fact be imminent.
9 Απριλίου 1975
Greece and Turkey are still at loggerheads over the Aegean; each side is maintaining that its actions are justified because of a threat from the other.
A high Greek Foreign Ministry official has admitted to the US embassy that his government has sent military forces, including aircraft, to the Dodecanese and other Aegean islands in contravention of international treaty. He said Turkish leaders had repeatedly made threatening statements about the islands.
The official said that Greece could not allow more Turkish overflights, which he claimed caused panic among the civilian population and created uncertainties which had economic implications throughout Greece, such as bank withdrawals, hoarding, and discouragement of tourists.
The Turks view Greek fortification of the islands a clear provocation. Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil told the US embassy on Monday that Ankara simply cannot have “armed aircraft carriers” so close to its shores. He said that it was essential for Turkey to monitor the situation.
The Turkish government yesterday again denied that it had violated Greek air space and publicly charged Greece with a military buildup on the islands. It said that Turkish aircraft will continue to fly over the Aegean in accordance with the rights given it by international law.
The Greeks believe that the Turks are trying to intimidate them, as well as to establish a de facto role for the Turkish armed forces in the Aegean.
24 Απριλίου 1980
Prime Minister Karamanlis yesterday received only 179 votes in the first round of the election in parliament for president –well short of the two-thirds majority of 200 votes required in the first two ballots.
Karamanlis has no serious competition, but the opposition Socialists and most Communists -who together control over 100 seats- are not supporting any candidate. This is likely to continue through the second round of balloting on Tuesday. Karamanlis probably will win in the third round, were only 180 votes are needed, but his margin of victory may be razor thin. An inconclusive third ballot would lead to a parliamentary election that public opinion polls suggest Karamanlis’ New Democracy Party would win.