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19 Σεπτεμβρίου 1954
The
Soviet government will support Greek claims to Cyprus
Comment:
Soviet support for Greek claims in the UN would be motivated primarily by Moscow ’s desire to weaken the West in the Mediterranean by promoting the transfer of the island
base from British to Greek control. After the evacuation of Suez
by British troops, Cyprus is
scheduled to become the headquarters for British ground and air forces in the Middle East . A pro-Greek stand by the USSR
25 Ιουνίου 1955
The Cyprus government believes that order can be
restored on the island only by immediate forceful action, according to the
American consul in Nicosia London
The
local population is increasingly apprehensive that the violence will spread,
and the government believes that firm action would be welcomed by “a large
number” of Cypriots. There are also increasing possibilities for serious
trouble between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
The Cyprus government has indirectly approached
Archbishop Makarios, leader of the movement seeking union of Cyprus with Greece ,
who is reported to have said he would support a liberal constitutional proposal
with recognition of the right to eventual self-determination for Cyprus
Comment:
Acceptance by Makarios of such a constitutional proposal might be a step toward
settlement of the Cyprus Greece
Continuation
of the Cyprus
10 Μαΐου 1956
The
new Cypriot crisis
The
imminent execution of two Greek Cypriots convicted of terrorist activities
against the British will probably result in increased violence on the island
and have serious repercussions in mainland Greece
Demonstrations
began in Cyprus
Possibly
even more significant are the reactions in Greece Athens
and Salonika and disorder will probably
increase if the executions are carried out. Greek police and army units have
been alerted to protect British and American installations and should be
capable of handling large-scale disorders. Rioters are likely to attack both US
and British installations.
The
executions, if they occur, would force the Greek government to take a stronger
stand against Britain Athens has already protested to London
and has appealed to the United
States Greece may break off diplomatic relations with Britain
23 Αυγούστου 1956
The
request by EOKA, the Cypriot nationalist organization, on 16August for a truce
with the British apparently
surprised both the Greek government and British authorities on Cyprus
EOKA
may have asked for a truce because the security forces have been making
progress in their antiterrorist campaign and because many Cypriots are
beginning to be disillusioned with EOKA’s policy of violence. The organization
may also have considered that the influence of the nationalist spokesman,
Archbishop Makarios, who has been in exile for six months, was diminishing and
a truce would give an excuse for bringing him back into the picture.
Greek
prime minister Karamanlis, although pleased at the improved prospects for
settling the dispute, has complained that his government should have been
consulted so it could have laid the diplomatic groundwork for American support
of compromise attempts. Greek officials reportedly feel that only Makarios has sufficient
prestige to negotiate a compromise with the British that would be acceptable
both to Cypriot nationalists and the Greek government.
Greek
foreign minister Averoff has expressed the intention of resuming talks with the
British and of sending the Greek ambassador back to London Seychelles
to London London Britain
Averoff
also would suggest a lower house of parliament with proportional Greek and
Turkish representation and an upper house with equal representation.
Greek
and Cypriot nationalist reaction to Harding’s offer has been unfavorable. The
mayor of Nicosia
Both
EOKA and Athens consider Makarios the key to
further negotiations with Britain
3 Μαρτίου 1958
Greek
Cabinet Resigns
The
resignation of Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and his cabinet on 2
March, following loss of a parliamentary majority when 15 deputies withdrew
their support, has placed the initiative for future political action in the
hands of King Paul. The 15 deputies have formed a new political party under
Panagiotis Papaligouras, one of two cabinet ministers who resigned on 27
February after a dispute with the prime minister regarding a new electoral law.
When
submitting his resignation, Karamanlis suggested that the King dissolve
parliament and call for new national elections. His actions in promoting a
split within his cabinet and then resigning may have been undertaken in the
hope that new elections would strengthen his position. However, many Greek
politicians including the leaders of the Liberals, second largest party in
Greece, are firmly opposed to elections at this time and are pressing the King
to appoint another conservative prime minister to head an interim government.
If elections are called immediately, they will be held under the present
electoral law which favors Karamanlis’ National Radical Union but also makes
probable an electoral coalition of center and leftist parties, as happened in
1956.
Elections
at this time would give Communist sympathizers and others an opportunity to
exploit popular feeling connected with the Cyprus issue and the possible
location of American missile bases in Greece. Failure to hold immediate
elections, however, would probably lead to a long period of political
instability in Greece, with the result that government initiative in the fields
of domestic and foreign policy would be seriously inhibited.
13 Μαΐου 1958
Greek
Elections
The
unexpectedly heavy vote received by the Communist front United Democratic Left
(EDA) in the Greek national elections on 11 May has overshadowed the absolute
victory of the conservative, pro-Western National Radical Union (ERE) of
Constantine Karamanlis. While ERE dropped to 42 percent of the popular vote compared
to 47 percent in the 1956 elections, it will increase its representation in the
new Chamber of Deputies from 164 seats to approximately 175. This will give
Karamanlis a substantial working majority in the 300-member parliament as long
as he is able to control the many diverse factions within his party.
The
complex electoral law, which permitted the ERE to take a sizable majority of
the parliamentary seats despite receiving a minority of the popular vote, also
works to the advantage of EDA, which gained a larga number of “bonus” seats for
running second. EDA nosed out the Liberal party, a traditional center party and
previously the second largest party in the chamber, and will increase its
representation from 17 seats in the old parliament to approximately 75 in the new. The Liberals
will decline from 67 seats to about 36, while two minor parties will account
for less than 20 in
the new parliament.
EDA
won about 24 percent of the total vote, apparently picking up a large “protest”
vote in addition to the votes of the far left party. Discontent among wage
earners, who object to the government’s wage-freeze policy, and among
nationalists, who disagree with Greece’s “inferior” role in NATO and the
apparent lack of progress toward a “desirable” solution of the Cyprus problem,
probably accounted for a significant proportion of EDA’s voting strength. The
vote probably does not indicate any substantial increase in the number of
hard-core Communist adherents in Greece.
The
position of EDA as leader of the opposition will tend to polarize Greek
politics and may lead to defections from the Liberals and the smaller parties
to the two major parties. While EDA will not be able to challenge the final
passage of ERE-sponsored legislation in the new parliament, it can be expected
to use every means to harass and delay the pro-Western policies of Karamanlis.
26 Ιουνίου 1958
Cyprus:
Archbishop Makarios apparently favors maintaining the status quo on Cyprus,
fearing the British and Turks would “gang up” against the Greeks if violence
were resumed. There is as yet no Turkish reaction to the Greek decision not to
cooperate with Turkey within NATO. Some Greek civilian NATO employees have
returned to Izmir, where special security measures are being relaxed.
Cyprus: It
appears likely, however, that the Greek Cypriots will continue their partial
boycott of British goods until Makarios is allowed to return to Cyprus.
Meanwhile,
the British have officially denied press reports that EOKA leader Grivas was
killed on 23 June. The report of his death, however, may cause Grivas to take
some action -a signed memorandum to the Cypriots, at least- to reassure the
population that he is still alive.
Information
from Turkey tends to confirm previous reports that the extraordinary security
measures taken near Greek, British, US and NATO installations in Izmir on 23
June were prompted by threatening remarks overheard and reported to the
governor of Izmir. Ten alleged Communists have been arrested for planning to
attack the British and Greek consulates in Izmir. A reduction in the number of
security troops was noted on 24 June, suggesting that any immediate danger was
considered over. The Turkish press continues to be inflammatory, and speakers
at recent mass meetings have been violently anti-Greek. The announcement on 24
June by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff that cooperation with Turkey in NATO was
no longer possible was probably based on a desire to placate anti-Turkish
feeling in Greece but may draw a sharp reaction from Ankara, which usually
disparages Greece’s contributions to NATO.
Governor
Foot’s sudden trip to London on 24 June was due to fear that anticipated Labor
party criticism of the government’s new Cyprus proposals in the 26 June debate
in Commons would lead to violence on Cyprus. Labor party leaders, however, had
previously decided not to oppose the proposals nor to force a vote on the issue.
8 Ιουλίου 1958
Cyprus: An
island-wide general strike has been launched to protest the death of two Greek
Cypriots in an open clash with British security forces.
Cyprus:
Cyprus is again the scene of murders, arson, intimidation and intercommunal
strife as each faction tries to outdo the other in exerting pressure on the
British. Greek Cypriots on 7 July staged a general strike to protest the death
of two demonstrators killed by British security forces during a brief clash
with several hundred Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots continue, by threats,
fire, and armed attack, to force Greeks to leave Turkish sectors of Cypriot
cities. They have also issued an ultimatum to Governor Foot threatening
violence, presumably against the British, if the government does not approve
separate municipal councils by 15 July.
In
the diplomatic phase of the dispute, all interested parties are showing more
flexibility regarding the British proposals. Athens has indicated a willingness
to accept the plan if both union with Greece and partition are ruled out and if
the Governor’s advisers are chose by the Cypriots instead of by Greece and
Turkey. The Turks continue to be adamant concerning eventual partition of
Cyprus but have again called for tripartite discussions on the problem.
The
best prospect for diplomatic progress appears to be in discussions among the
permanent North Atlantic Council representatives of Britain, Greece, and
Turkey. Permanent representatives of Greece and Turkey have been recalled to
Athens and Ankara for top-level discussions.
In
contrast to the expressed optimism of Prime Minister Macmillan regarding the
diplomatic prospects, Governor Foot is discouraged by continued Greek violence,
which prevents the return of Archbishop Makarios, regarded by him as essential
for any real progress toward settlement of the problem. He has contacted
Makarios requesting a period free of violence for apparently two months.
16 Αυγούστου 1958
Cyprus:
Britain’s announcement on 15 August that it intends to begin carrying out a
modified version of its Cyprus plan indicates London intends to go ahead in the
face of warning about adverse effects among the Greek-Cypriots and on the Greek
government.
Britain
Announces Modifications of Cyprus Plan
Britain
acted swiftly to announce implementation of its seven-year plan for Cyprus
following the return of Prime Minister Macmillan from his visit to Athens,
Ankara, and Nicosia. The plan, as announced in London on 15 August, contains
several modifications of the original plan made public on 19 June. These changes
appear designed to overcome Greek objections to the proposals while retaining
the general features of the plan which Turkey previously accepted.
Modifications
designed to appeal to Athens include: elimination of official representatives
of Greece and Turkey on the Governor’s Council –though official representatives
to the governor’s office still be appointed; indefinite postponement of the
provisions calling for Cypriots to have dual nationality; and a vague reference
to the possibility of a single island-wide legislature at some future date. In
addition, the British again have announced that, following a period of peace on
the island, Archbishop Makarios will be allowed to return to participate in
electoral preparations.
While
the British announcement goes far to ease Greek fears that partition is being
facilitated by the new plan, it does not preclude the possibility of eventual
partition. In addition, the new announcement calls upon the governor to
authorize, where feasible, the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish
Cypriot municipal councils.
Immediate
Greek reaction is unfavorable, with both Foreign Minister Averoff and a
representative of Makarios terming the new plan “unacceptable”. Averoff’s
principal objections are centered on the retention of official representatives
of Greece and Turkey and the proposed separate municipal councils.
Ankara’s
reaction to the British modifications is unknown. Turkish leaders informed
Macmillan during his recent trip to Ankara, however, that they would support
the original plan but would demand a tripartite meeting of Britain, Greece, and
Turkey if modifications were introduced.
Britain’s
first step in implementing the new plan will be the preparation of electoral
rolls for the island, which may take two or three months. Meanwhile, London has
called on Athens and Ankara to appoint their representatives by 1 October to
confer with Cyprus Governor Foot.
30 Αυγούστου 1958
Cyprus:
The relations of EOKA leader Grivas with Athens and Archbishop Makarios are
deteriorating. This lessens the ability of the Greek government and the
Archbishop to restrain future EOKA activities.
Cyprus:
The voluntary cease-fire maintained by the Greek-Cypriot underground
organization EOKA since 4 August may be broken in the near future and new
attacks launched against the British. EOKA has been hurt by recent British
security drives on Cyprus, and EOKA leader Grivas may be tempted to renew
violence before his forces are further reduced by capture or declining morale.
He has indicated his dissatisfaction at the “indecisiveness” of the Greek
Government and its failure to threaten withdrawal from the Western alliance
system unless its allies show greater sympathy on the Cyprus problem. Relations
between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios have also deteriorated. A complete
rupture in their relations, while improbable at this time, would eliminate one
of the few potential restraints on the EOKA leader.
Both
Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Averoff appear to favor continued peace on
the island while they seek a favorable resolution regarding Cyprus at the next
regular session of the UNGA. The British have repeatedly indicated that
following a limited period of peace on Cyprus they would permit the return of
Makarios from exile –a move much desired by most Greek Cypriots.
Meanwhile,
the government of Greece continues its refusal to cooperate in implementing
London’s new plan for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, who constitute 80 percent of
the population of the island, are also united in opposing the plan. Greek
Foreign Minister Averoff hopes this noncooperation will force London to make
further concessions to the Greek position. The British, however, realize that
further concessions to Athens might cause the Turks to reconsider their
decision to cooperate.
Cooperation
between Greece and the US continues to be affected by Greek belief that
Washington is supporting the Anglo-Turkish “side” in the Cyprus dispute.
18 Φεβρουαρίου 1959
Cyprus:
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis fears that Archbishop Makarios may “torpedo”
the London conference on Cyprus. The British also express concern. Makarios
reportedly has already balked over Britain’s request for guarantees of base
rights and would certainly oppose a transition period of about a year as
envisaged by London. Makarios has the support of the Greek Cypriots and his
opposition to the plan would make its implementation difficult.
31 Μαρτίου 1960
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
The Cyprus Problem
The
long-standing dispute over the future status of the British crown colony of
Cyprus was regarded by most observers as resolved by a series of international
agreements signed in London in February 1959 which provided for complete
independence. The signatories represented Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two
major communities on Cyprus –the 450.000 Greek Cypriots and the 100.000 Turkish
Cypriots. Good progress in implementing the agreement was made during the
ensuing months but in late 1959
a serious controversy developed over the size of the two
bases Britain is to retain. As a result, independence for Cyprus, which was to
have been proclaimed by 19 February 1960, has been postponed. Relations between
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which had improved dramatically following
conclusions of the Cyprus agreements in 1959, have begun to show new strains as
a result of the present impasse.
The
Cyprus agreements provided that Britain would transfer sovereignty over the
island to the new Republic of Cyprus except for two areas – neither
specifically demarcated. The agreements also specified that the new republic
would assure Britain “the rights and facilities necessary to enable the two
areas to be used effectively as military bases”. At Akrotiri, on the
southernmost tip of Cyprus, the British maintain on of the largest air bases in
the Middle East and are in the process of establishing there the headquarters
of their unified Middle East Command.
In
discussing the base problems, the Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios,
president elect of the future Cypriot Republic, attempted from the beginning to
limit the base areas to a maximum of 36 square miles. The Turkish Cypriots,
under Fazil Kuchuk, the future vice president, favored limiting the British to
the smallest possible areas, although they have been less rigid in their
position than the Greek Cypriots.
The
British originally requested about 150 square miles but later reduced this to
120 square miles.
The
Turkish Cypriots have sought to mediate with a proposal of 80 square miles.
This is acceptable to Makarios, but it has been rejected by the British. London
has also rejected other proposed compromises, such as putting part of the
proposed base areas under long-term lease to the British.
Currently
there is considerable speculation in Nicosia about a compromise at
approximately 100 square miles. While Greek Cypriot spokesman have indicated
that any figure under 100 probably would be acceptable, the British have
insisted they cannot reduce their demand for 120 square miles by more than a
token amount.
The
British proposals have been publicly rejected by Makarios largely on economic
grounds –complaining that the base areas contain some of the best arable land
on the island and a disproportional amount of vital water resources. His real
reasons, however, appear to be an exaggerated fear that he would lose political
support on Cyprus by capitulating to the British and his “intuition” that
London will eventually make further concessions. A major concession by Makarios
to the British on the base issue would reduce his popular prestige. With no
other nationalist leader of stature among the Greek Cypriots, a real decline in
his popularity would probably redound to the advantage of the Communist-led
political party on the island, which is presently believed capable of securing
the support of 35 percent of the Greek voters.
Recent
warnings that the present negotiations could break down and imperil the original
settlement have caused uneasiness, particularly among the Turkish Cypriots.
Miscalculation on the part of the present negotiators could of course, lead to
a breakdown, with its attendant threat to security. It appears unlikely to us,
however, that any party to the original Cyprus agreements would permit a real
breakdown and possible repudiation of that settlement.
17 Οκτωβρίου 1963
MEMORANDUM
FOR: SECRATARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
New Action Program for Cyprus
The
President is concerned over reports that we may be headed for trouble in
Cyprus. He feels we should do all we can in cooperation with the Guarantor
Powers to prevent a showdown between the Greek and Turkish communities.
He
would like the Department of State to provide him by 28 October with its recommendations
on what measures might be taken to this end.
19 Ιουνίου 1964
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE
CYPRUS DISPUTE
THE
PROBLEM
To
examine possible lines of settlement of the Cyprus dispute and their
implications for the parties involved.
CONCLUSIONS
A.
The present drift toward a de facto Greek Cypriot state cannot go much further
without provoking a more serious military confrontation with the Turkish
Cypriots. An independent Cyprus has come to pose the dangers of provoking an
invasion by Turkey to prevent the island from falling wholly under Greek
Cypriot sway or of becoming heavily Communist-influenced, and these
considerations are becoming of increasing concern to the Western countries most
intimately involved.
B.
An early settlement based on the hope of cooperation between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots is virtually precluded by their mutual hostility. Two remaining
possibilities are enosis (union with Greece) and double enosis (division of the
island between Greece and Turkey). Most Greek Cypriots favor the former, but
all would be strongly opposed to the latter. Whatever Makarios’ private view,
he would find it difficult openly to oppose enosis. Either enosis or double
enosis would make continuance of UK bases and US facilities likely. Both
solutions would be opposed by the USSR and the UAR, which dislike the
maintenance of Western power positions in the Levant.
C.
To force a settlement and to make it work would require the support of Athens,
which strongly favors enosis, and of Ankara, which advocates the double enosis
solution. It is possible that both governments could accept a combination of
the two approaches: i.e., a Cyprus united to Greece, but containing an area
under some sort of Turkish administration. But it would be a tricky business
since both governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of
military and political pressures on Inonu’s minority government, Athens because
for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership.
D.
An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which
would result at least for a time in damage to US relations with Greece, or
Turkey, or both. Failing a settlement, we believe that Turkey would be moved to
intervene to protect the Turkish community. In this case, Greece would be
prepared to send additional forces to Cyprus. In the tension and confusion,
armed clashes would be likely, but both sides would be reluctant to expand
hostilities.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE
1.
Despite a long history of Greek-Turkish animosity, dating from the Greek
struggle for independence from Turkey during the nineteenth century, the Greek
and Turkish communities on Cyprus, which came under British control in 1878,
lived together for many years without serious strife. Then in the 1950’s,
violent agitation by the Greek community for enosis (union with Greece)
directly involved Greece and Turkey with their communities on the island. The
resulting disorders were finally ended by the London-Zurich Accords, which
established an independent Cyprus based on the concept of administrative
separation of the two communities without geographic partition. To secure the
agreement of all parties it was necessary to include o Treaty of Guarantee
which gave Greece, Turkey, and the UK the right to intervene jointly or
individually in the internal affairs of the island should this be deemed
necessary to uphold the agreements.
2.
Lack of mutual confidence prevented the two communities from cooperating in
running the government. The Greek majority (80 percent of the population) was
determined to get rid of the constitutional provisions which gave the Turkish
minority a veto power in matters of foreign affairs, defense and key domestic
issues. For their part, the Turks clung rigidly to the constitutional
safeguards as their best protection against the Greek majority. In late 1963,
President Makarios presented 13 amendments to the constitution which would have
created a unitary state under majority rule. Turkey quickly rejected these
proposals. In this tense atmosphere, a minor incident sparked violence which
rapidly engulfed the island. The more numerous and better organized Greek
communal forces quickly seized the initiative and isolated the Turkish
community. The British peace-keeping force, which went into operation in
January 1964 with the consent of the order Guarantor Powers and both Cypriot
communities, incurred the animosity of both communities and was unable to
prevent new violence. The activation of a UN peace-keeping force in March 1964
has brought about a gradual reduction in violence, though both sides are
dissatisfied with the situation. Moreover, the continued receipt of arms by
both communities has turned the island into an armed camp, and hatred and
bitterness have reached a high level.
II.
THE FORCES AT WORK
The
Greek community and Athens
3.
Makarios is clearly the paramount figure on the island. He is a shred bargainer
and a clever political manipulator. He appears to enjoy his position as head of
an independent state. We are not certain of his private view of the enosis
issue, though it is a popular cause among the Greek Cypriots and he cannot
openly oppose it. Though he generally makes the final decisions in Greek
communal affairs, his control is far from complete. There is a group of
secondary leaders who have sharp personal differences and sometimes disagree on
issues and tactics, and clashes between their followers cannot be ruled out.
Next to Makarios in influence is probably General George Grivas, the former
leader of EOKA, the militant Greek Cypriot organization that fought for enosis
in the 1950’s. Grivas has thus far not challenged Makarios’ political primacy,
but he is a fervent anti-Communist and advocate of enosis. The growing
sentiment for enosis in Cyprus tends to increase Grivas’ prestige and
influence. He has many supporters on the island, including Minister of Interior
Georkatzis and the newly appointed commander of the Greek Cypriot National
Guard, an organization designed to supersede the various autonomous armed bands.
4.
Since the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the already significant
influence of Communist-oriented groups in the Greek community has increased.
Makarios apparently does not regard the Communist as an immediate threat, and has
taken no action against them. The Communist Party (AKEL), which probably
influences between one-fourth to one-third of the Greek Cypriots, has strongly
supported Makarios. Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, who is Makarios’ personal physician
and confidant, has emerged as a leader of a Communist-influenced guerilla band
and as an important go-between with the Soviet Ambassador.
5.
At the moment, Makarios is something of an embarrassment for Athens. On
occasion the Greek Government has even attempted -without conspicuous success-
to hold Makarios in check, particularly in discouraging his entanglements with
the Bloc. However, public opinion in Greece so strongly supports the
aspirations of the Greek community that it has been difficult for any Greek
government openly to oppose Makarios. The Greek Government clearly favors union
with Cyprus as merely an intermediate stage. However, Athens feels inhibited to
some extent in voicing these views by a number of considerations. In fact, the
Greek Government has publicly handled the Cyprus problem in relatively low key,
though it has at least tacitly condoned clandestine arms shipments and has
allowed the Greek military contingent to aid the Greek Cypriots.
The
Turkish community and Ankara
6.
The Turkish communal leadership is neither strong nor self-sufficient. Its most
able member, Raul Denktash, has been prevented by Makarios from returning to
the island since January 1964. Both he and Vice President Kuchuk, the
community’s nominal leader, have been almost entirely subservient to Ankara.
Indeed, the Turkish community has little scope for independent action since its
weakness vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriots forces to rely directly to Turkish
military and diplomatic support for its very existence. Thus Turkey, not the
Turkish community on Cyprus, calls the tune.
7.
For some time the Turks have been supplying men and material to the beleaguered
community. Some regroupment of the Turkish community has taken place, in part
for reasons of security, in part to create a basis for partition or federation.
This regroupment, though far from complete, has made it possible for the
Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization and the Turkish army contingent
stationed on Cyprus to provide a measure of protection. This protection and the
threat of Turkish intervention have kept hope alive among the Turkish Cypriots
and stiffened their determination to resist. Nevertheless, the regard their
future with apprehension bordering on desperation.
Other
Outside Forces
8.
Britain’s obligations as a Guarantor Power and its concern for its sovereign
base areas on the island have kept the UK closely involved in the dispute. Aw might
be expected, this involvement has resulted in changes by each community that
the British are unduly favoring the other and has led to increasing opposition
by the Greek Cypriots to the British sovereign bases. The British role has also
periodically caused disappointment and anger in Athens and Ankara. Despite
recent reductions, the UK contingent in still the largest in the peace-keeping
force. Moreover, London has just indicated a willingness to make an additional
financial contribution to the support of the operation.
9.
Both the UN Secretary General and the powers concerned recognize that the
peace-keeping force will be needed on Cyprus for more than the three months
authorized. The UN force has had difficulty in establishing order, and the
present tenuous equilibrium could be upset at any time. UN mediator Tuomioja
has been unable to devise any proposals for a realistic settlement. Though he
seems personally inclined toward enosis, he apparently feels it inappropriate
for him to recommend the dissolution of a UN state. If the recommendations of
the UN mediator are not satisfactory to Makarios, the latter may take the
Cyprus controversy to the UN General Assembly where he obviously counts on
diplomatic support from the Soviet Bloc and the nonaligned nations.
10.
The possibility of Greek-Turkish clashes over Cyprus has aroused concern in
NATO, but Secretary General Stikker has so far been unable to move the two
sides closer together. NATO intercession is not likely to prove effective in
promoting a settlement, though the psychological effect of NATO membership
probably tends to inhibit an outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities or limit any
clash that might occur.
11.
The Soviets see clear opportunities as well as dangers in the dispute. Its
prolongation obviously weakens NATO. Moscow also desires the elimination of
British sovereign bases on Cyprus, in order to undermine the ability of the UK
to support its interests in the Near and Middle East. Soviet prestige on Cyprus
has risen as a result of Moscow’s support of Makarios. The emergence of an
independent unitary Greek Cypriot state would increase the prospects for
greater Soviet influence on the island. However, the Soviets seem concerned
lest their involvement give impetus to demands for enosis, which would lead to
restrictions on the Communists and a reduced role for Moscow. They are also
worried about intervention by Turkey, which would create a major crisis and
jeopardize the continued independence of Cyprus. Hence, though they feel bound
to support Makarios as the leader of a “national liberation struggle”, they
recognize the disadvantages of any serious involvement. Makarios has sought to
obtain stronger Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause and has given
considerable publicity to his request for heavy arms. It seems likely that the
Soviets will attempt to stall of any decision to supply heavy arms, though they
may furnish small arms, ammunition, and the like –perhaps through the UAR, from
which some arms have already reached Makarios. The USSR has been at some pains
to limit the damage to its relations with Turkey.
12.
The UAR seeks the elimination of British bases, which it regards as primarily
designed to exert military pressure on the Arabs. The UAR also would not like
to see the absorption of a formerly nonaligned state into a NATO member state.
Thus it supports an independent Cyprus under Makarios. To this end the UAR has
given small arms and probably will continue to do so.
III.
THE OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMEN
13.
During the past six months, the situation on Cyprus has moved a considerable
distance toward the de facto establishment of a Greek Cypriot state. The Greek
Cypriots are in complete control of the government, and seem determined to push
ahead and achieve full control of the island. The Turkish Cypriots are
constantly threatened with shortages of food, medicine, and water.
Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots have substantially improved their defensive
position by virtue of their regroupment and the arms they have received from
Turkey. We believe that Ankara would intervene military in the island rather
than see the Turkish Cypriot position eroded away or extinguished.
14.
At the same time, both Athens and Ankara are coming to the conclusion that a
fully independent Cyprus is not in their interest, or in the interest of the
West in general. If Makarios achieved such status, he might move to eliminate
the British bases, and he would have no compunctions about accepting Soviet
support for the effort. The US special facilities on the island would also be
in serious danger. Moreover, Makarios apparently sees little danger in
cooperating with the Cypriot Communists, who are strong and well organized.
There is a significant chance that an independent Cyprus would gradually fall
under increasing Communist influence and perhaps in time under Communist
control.
15.
Any early settlement based on the hope of future cooperation between the Greek
and Turkish communities is virtually precluded by the bitterness and hostility
that has grown up between them. This would appear to rule out implementation of
the London-Zurich Accords. Nor would the Greek Cypriots accept a “federation”
which recognized and protected the rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a
community rather than as individual citizens in a Greek Cypriot controlled
state. “Partition” -the establishment of two independent states on the island-
would be strongly opposed by the Greek community and, even if it could be
brought about, would probably involve continuing hostilities between the two
entities.
16.
Present circumstances have brought two more fundamental approaches under
consideration. One is enosis (union with Greece). The other is some formula
under which the island would be divided between Greece and Turkey; this has
come to be known as double enosis.
Double
Enosis
17.
Double enosis would be the more acceptable to the Turks. It probably would
permit continuance of the British base areas, though perhaps not in their
present sovereign status. It would almost certainly permit the US facilities to
remain. However, even if agreement were reached on the principle of double
enosis, there would be extreme haggling over how the island was to be divided.
While extensive population shifts would be necessary, we regard these as less
difficult to arrange than to gain Greek Cypriot acceptance of such a division.
There would be a serious danger that the Greek Cypriots would launch an all-out
attack on the areas held by the Turkish community if they thought it necessary
to prevent such a settlement. Further, it is unlikely that any Greek government
could accept double enosis and remain in office. There might be considerable
opposition in the UN, with the USSR taking a leading part.
18.
Support for double enosis by the US would have a severe impact on US-Greek relations.
Thus far US relations with Greece have not suffered any extensive damage, as
the US has not pressed the Greek Government toward any particular solution.
However, the continuing threat of Turkish intervention is eroding the Greeks’
confidence in the US, which they believe has the power to prevent any Turkish
move. Moreover, as proposals for solution emerge, the Greeks will be quick to
resent and will strongly resist US efforts to encourage concessions.
Enosis
19.
The Turks have so far refused to consider enosis as a solution. They would view
the possession of Cyprus by Greece as contrary to their own strategic
interests, though less threatening than if the island were in the hands of a
Communist-influenced Greek Cypriot Government. They are also moved by
considerations of prestige and by concern for the welfare of the Turkish
community. Those Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island would have to
be compensated, and such compensation might be more acceptable to Ankara if it
came, at least apparently, from the Greeks. Moreover, in view of its distrust
of the Greek Cypriot leadership, Ankara would probably insist that Cyprus not
retain any significant autonomy, but be run directly from Athens like other
Greek provinces. More important, any settlement probably would have to provide
some sort of continuing Turkish presence on the island. A settlement including
a Turkish base or an enclave under Turkish sovereignty might come to be
regarded by Turkey as acceptable, since it could provide some degree of protection
for Turkish strategic interests and an element of security -at least
psychological- to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks have thus far shown little
interest in territorial concessions in the Greek islands and only slightly more
in Thrace. What they want is a presence on Cyprus itself.
20.
The Turkish Government has only limited flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Inonu
himself is aware of the perils involved, concerned for Turkey’s ties with the
West (especially the US), and desirous of attaining a negotiated solution. But
feels that the political military supporters on whom his minority government
depends, as well as popular opinion, demand the protection of Turkish national
prestige and Turkish interests on Cyprus, so that he must threaten unilateral
intervention when these are in danger. The repeated postponements of military
moves against Cyprus have created an atmosphere of disappointment and
frustration which has already threatened to disrupt the delicate equilibrium of
the Turkish political scene. Indeed, if another intervention crisis should
arise -as is likely unless some tangible progress toward a solution is made in
the near future- Inonu might be faced with the choice of acquiescing in a
military move or being pushed aside. He would have extreme difficulty in
persuading parliament and the military to accept enosis –even coupled with
territorial or base concessions.
21.
The leverage which the US or other Western powers can exert on Turkey is
limited. Turkish threats of unilateral intervention have already produced a
series of confrontations with the US, each growing in intensity and each
progressively embittering relations. The mutual confidence which previously
underlay Turkish-American relations has been shaken. There would be a danger
that if the US pressed hard for enosis, the Turks would feel betrayed and
decide to intervene militarily. If the reached such a decision, there is a good
change they would not consult or even inform us. If they did not intervene,
they would make a major effort -perhaps by putting pressure on the US presence
in Turkey- to convince the US that they should have a presence on Cyprus of a
scope and nature sufficient to satisfy their political needs.
22.
Athens is coming to recognize that no Turkish Government could accept enosis
without a quid pro quo of some significance. Athens would almost certainly be
willing to provide some compensation for resettlement of Turkish Cypriots; it
would almost certainly not be ready to cede any territory already Greek. Greece
probably would agree to the presence of Turkish forces on a NATO base on the
island. Whether Athens would concede the degree of “Turkishness” that would be
required to make the proposition acceptable to Ankara would depend upon a
complex of factors, among which would be Papandreou’s attitude, Athens’ reading
of Ankara’s intervention intentions, and Western pressure on Greece.
23.
Acceptance of an enclave under Turkish administration would be difficult for
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. While his parliamentary majority depends on
his ability to maintain discipline among the various elements of the governing
Center Union, we believe he could win approval of such a concession. If he
could be convinced that it was essential. We believe that he is limited in his
freedom of maneuver more by his personal convictions and disinclination to
exercise leadership than by forces outside his control. If union of the whole
island with Greece were involved, Papandreou could probably count on strong
support from Greek Cypriot public opinion to overcome whatever resistance
Makarios might offer, but such support might not be forthcoming for a
settlement involving a Turkish presence on the island.
Likely
Developments
24.
Settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would
result, at least for some time, in damage to US relations with Greece, or
Turkey, or both. Athens has, at least until recently, seen the tide as flowing
in the direction of enosis and is not yet prepared to make any concessions in
the direction of double enosis, which the Turks would probably regard as their
minimum requirement. It is likely that a combination of elements from both
approaches holds out the best chance of an agreed solution –particularly if the
use of provocative labels can be avoided.
25.
It may be that the parties involved will prove so intractable as to prevent any
agreement. In this case, the plight of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually
worsen, though a continued UN presence might afford them some protection. But
the possibility of acute crisis without warning would persist. In the event of
a massacre of Turkish Cypriots, a direct attack on the Turkish contingent, or
an immediate threat of sizable Soviet involvement on the island, the Turks
would almost certainly feel the need to take military action. Moreover, as time
passes without any improvement in the prospects of success, desperation may
overtake elements in the Turkish community and cause them to precipitate a
major crisis. Pressure to intervene is also building up in the Turkish armed
forces and in various levels of the government. Thus Turkish intervention will
remain a constant danger.
26.
If the Turks intervened, they would justify their action as designed merely for
the protection of the Turkish community. But Athens would probably feel
compelled to respond by sending additional forces to Cyprus. Though both sides
would be reluctant to expand hostilities, the tension and confusion would be
likely to result in armed clashes. If, at this point, Greece and Turkey found
themselves on the brink of war, their leaders might finally be willing to make
the compromises required for a settlement. However, a settlement reached under
these conditions would not necessarily be a final solution; it could just as
well be another patchwork arrangement.
MILITARY
ANNEX
1.
Organized military forces on the island currently number approximately 6,000 UN
troops, 12,000 UK forces not assigned to the UN, 950 Greek army personnel, and
650 Turkish army personnel. President Makarios is organizing a 25,000-30,000
man Special Security Force or National Guard. Probably at least some of these
guardsmen will be conscripted from the estimated 35,000 Greek Cypriots
irregulars reported to be on the island. The National Guard is designed to
absorb some of the so-called private armies, some with as many as 600 men,
which are part of the current Greek Cypriot irregular forces. The Turkish
Cypriots have a smaller irregular force, estimated at 10,000.
2.
For the most part these personnel are well supplied with small arms. Both sides
have mortars, rocket launchers, hand grenades and the like. The Greek Cypriots
have affixed armor plate protection to several tractor vehicles and may also
have acquired three British 12 ton tanks. Additionally, the Greek Cypriots are
seeking to acquire artillery, at least four light aircraft and two helicopters,
12 jet fighters, and nine fast patrol boats. Makarios has stated that he
intends to acquire heavy weapons such as aircraft and antiaircraft artillery,
presumably from the USSR. Greece has provided officers to assist in organizing
and training the Greek Cypriot forces, as well as weapons for those forces.
Turkey is training personnel and smuggling them and weapons to the Turkish
Cypriots on the island. Thus, each side is in the process of supplying,
organizing, and training its forces. The adversaries are temporarily separated
from each other by the UN forces.
3.
The current status differs materially from the situation on 21 December 1963
when the disorders erupted. At that time it was reported that the Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots each had about 3,000 armed irregulars, although
each side probably had many more weapons hidden away. While the size and
composition of the Greek and Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus are regulated by
treaty and thus were the same in December as they are today, there had not yet
occured those murders and other incidents which have hardened the feelings of
the contingents against each other. It was in the face of the foregoing, that
in early January the British moved 2,500 troops to enforce the truce which had
been agreed to by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. During the three months that
the British singlehandedly enforced the peace, there was a steady buildup in
the numbers and types of weapons brought in either “legally” to the Greek
Cypriot-controlled forces or surreptitiously to the Turkish Cypriot irregulars.
Lacking terms of reference to curtail arms shipments, the UN forces have noted
an intensification of the arms buildup since the arrival of the UN on the
island about three months ago.
4.
This relative quiet is in marked contrast to the period almost ten yeasts ago
when EOKA Greek Cypriot terrorism to attain ENOSIS (union with Greece) resulted
in a British pacification campaign requiring 20,000 to 25,000 troops. The EOKA,
while relatively few in number, enlisted the support of a sympathetic or
terrorized Greek Cypriot population and made good use of the island’s terrain,
which is suited for guerilla activity, inflicting about 250 casualties on the
British forces during a four year period. Although the British exiled Makarios
and engaged in a relentless and ruthless campaign, the disorders ended, as they
had started, because of political factors.
5.
Both Greece and Turkey have the capability to alter the present balance of
military power on the island. Turkey’s military establishment is considerably
superior to that of Greece. The Turkish armed forces outnumber those of Greece
and are better equipped. Moreover, in any military action concentrated on the
Cyprus area, Ankara’s advantage would be enhanced by its proximity to the
island. Both forces are deficient in logistic support, communications
equipment, and combat vehicles. In particular, deficiencies in ammunition and
petroleum would limit operations in any protracted conflict.
6.
Turkey’s advantage is most pronounced in its ground forces. The Turkish army of
350,000 outnumbers the Greek by more than three to one, and 15 days after
mobilization of reserves its effective combat strength by NATO standards would
be 500,000, nearly double that of Greece. Both armies are concentrated along
the borders of their Communist neighbors to the north. Turkey’s 39th Division, however, which numbers
nearly 12,000 men and has an excellent combat capability, is based in the
Iskenderun area. While it is oriented primarily toward the Syrian border, it is
the parent unit of the 650-man contingent on Cyprus. It has conducted extensive
training maneuvers recently and is generally kept ready to intervene in Cyprus
on short notice. Greece has also increased its level of readiness, moving
several hundred men to Crete and maintaining other forces alert.
7.
Neither country has any highly developed capability in amphibious warfare or in
airborne operations, though both are increasing their capability through
maneuvers. Greece, despite its generally superior navy and greater seaborne
support capability for extended operations, would be extremely vulnerable in
mounting any action on Cyprus, by reason of long, exposed supply lines. Both
countries have ample civilian carriers for any major troop movement, but
Turkey’s proximity to Cyprus would give it a substantial advantage in any
deployment there. Moreover, the Turks have a five to one advantage in
submarines.
8.
The Turkish Air Force is superior to that of Greece. The Turks have a fairly
proficient fighter-bomber force, including F-100 and F-104 jet aircraft. The
Greeks have only recently received their first few Century series aircraft
(F-104s). Most of the Turkish Air Force is located within striking distance of
Cyprus, with tactical bombs and napalm containers are stocked at a base less
than 200 miles
from the island. The air force is capable of close support and reconnaissance
missions in the Cyprus area. The Turks could airlift one battalion to Cyprus if
they were able to seize control of an airfield on the island. The Greek Air
Force, based primarily on the Greek mainland some 500 miles from Cyprus,
would experience great difficulty in operating in the area. Some operations
could be mounted from Rhodes, within 300 miles of Cyprus, but additional logistic
equipment would have to be moved there. The Greeks have the technical
capability to airlift a battalion or two to Cyprus, but Turkish air superiority
could turn any such operation into a disaster.
8 Δεκεμβρίου 1967
Cyprus:
The Turkish Government is keeping close watch on developments as the
Greek withdrawal begins.
The
Turks are still annoyed by the diplomatic maneuvers of President Makarios which
they believe is designed to vitiate the thrust of the recent agreement. Ankara
strongly desires that some way be devised for the UN force on Cyprus to monitor
the withdrawal of Greek mainland troops.
The
bulk of the Turkish special Cyprus invasion force remains concentrated along
Turkey’s southern coast as a reminder of Ankara’s continuing determination to
uphold its position on Cyprus.
3 Μαρτίου 1972
CYPRUS:
Archbishop Makarios probably will reject the demand of the Cypriot Bishop that
he resign as president. The Bishop’s action is causing renewed fears of civil
disturbance.
In
response to the three Bishop’s demand, which reportedly was made under the
influence of Athens, Makarios asked for time to consider their request and has
called an emergency meeting of his cabinet. A special meeting of the House of
Representatives is also scheduled for today.
If
the three Bishops remain united, under Canon law they could theoretically strip
Makarios of his ecclesiastical functions should he refuse to resign as
president. However, in past confrontations with the Bishops, Makarios has had
no trouble in dividing and outmaneuvering them. Makarios will probably first
attempt a public campaign against the Bishops, and mass demonstrations are
planned in support of the Archbishop in Nicosia today. If the campaign fails
and civil disturbances threaten Cypriot stability, Makarios might resign and
call for a plebiscite. At present, all indications are that the majority of
Greek Cypriots would support the Archbishop.
28 Ιανουαρίου 1974
CYPRUS:
The leadership of George Grivas’ National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle
will pass to former Cyprus Army Major Stavros Stavrou, his second-in-command.
The announcement was made by officials of the Grivas organization following
Grivas’ death from a heart attack in southern Cyprus yesterday. Stavrou was
arrested several months ago in a government crackdown that has left the
organization in poor shape to survive Griva’s death.
9 Απριλίου 1974
CYPRUS:
The UN’s special representative on Cyprus is trying to work out a formula that
will allow resumption of the intercommunal talks, which adjourned last week
without setting a new date for negotiations. Prospects for the six-year-old
talks’ resuming after a period of hard bargaining appear relatively good.
The
current impasse was precipitated by the Greek Cypriots, who chose to make an
issue of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s public statement on March 29 that
advocated a federal system of government for Cyprus. Federalism is anathema to
President Makarios and the Greek Cypriots, who insist that talks are pointless
unless the object is the creation of a unitary, independent Cypriot state.
Turkish Cypriot Vice President Denktash and the Turkish ambassador in Cyprus
have tried to play down Ecevit’s statement, claiming misinterpretation and
denying that there has been any change in Turkish policy toward Cyprus.
Although
Ecevit and his party are on record as favoring federalism for Cyprus, this
presumably represents Ankara’s maximum bargaining position. Similarly, the
Greek Cypriot’s decision to stall the talks at this time on the basis of
statements made only in Turkey is essentially a tactical gambit. President
Makarios has declared that if the deadlock is not broken, the Cyprus issue
should be returned to the UN.
Athens
last week repeated its standard line in support of the intercommunal talks and
an independent, unitary Cypriot state. President Makarios fears, however, that
Athens may be playing a double game by clandestinely supporting enosis, which
aims at the union of Cyprus and Greece, and by plotting against him.
17 Αυγούστου 1974
CYPRUS
GENERAL
SITUATION
1.
No major fighting occurred on Cyprus today, although cease-fire violations were
widespread as Turkish units attempted to secure areas beyond what they held
yesterday. In Greece, there were continuing signs of growing anti-US sentiment
but no serious incidents. Meanwhile, the Turks seem quite satisfied with their
present position although there are no prospects for an early resumption of the
peace talks.
THE
MILITARY SITUATION
2.
Localized fighting continued on Cyprus today despite the cease-fire. Fighting
around the international airport appears to have ended by mid-afternoon, but 12 miles southeast of
Nicosia Turkish forces captured the village of Pyroi after a fierce battle. A
UN observer believes that the Turks will now move toward Louroujina, some seven
miles south of Pyroi, to link up with Turkish Cypriots who have been holding
out against Greek National Guard attacks.
3.
The Turkish advance constitutes the most serious violation of the cease-fire
south of the “Attila Line” which supposedly delimits the southern boundary of
Turkish territorial claims on the island.
4.
Elsewhere, sporadic fighting was reported at Limnitis and Kokkina in the west
of the island.
GREECE
– US
5. Ambassador
Tasca has been given assurances by the ministry of foreign affairs as well as
by Minister of Defense Averoff that the appropriate security officials have
been instructed to provide protection to US personnel and installations and to
take extra precautions in the present tense circumstances. The ambassador
received similar assurances from the Athens police chief and the commanding
general of the gendarmerie.
6.
... a large anti-American demonstration was held in the city this afternoon but
that the demonstrators did not march on the base as had been feared. Greek
police and army leaders on the island have promised full support in protecting
the base. In addition, a US carrier group is now about 30 miles from Iraklion and
is standing by to evacuate personnel should that become necessary.
7.
Elsewhere in Greece, relations between Greek and US military personnel have
moved from friendly to formal. Moreover, there are some cases in which US
airmen and ships were prevented from reaching supplies and equipment, or were
required to make long detours to do so. There have been some reports that US
vehicles and servicemen in uniforms have been stoned and verbally abused
outside US bases.
DIPLOMATIC
ACTIVITY
8.
Yugoslav Vice-President and Foreign Minister Milos Minic met today with Greek
Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Mavros. Quoting diplomatic
sources in Athens, UPI reports that Minic brought a message from Tito urging
the Greeks and Turks to begin talking again. UPI also reports that Minic is
scheduled to travel on to Ankara tomorrow to deliver Tito’s message to Turkish
leaders, indicating that the Yugoslavs may be seeking a mediating role.
9.
An early resumption of the peace talks seems unlikely, however, as the Greeks
continue to refuse to negotiate in the face of a “fait accompli.” ... the
current Greek position is that the Turkish troops must pull back to position
held on August 9 -prior to the second round of fighting- before talks can resume.
CYPRIOT
VIEWS
10.
Political consultations in Nicosia intensified today. Luis Weckmann, special
representative of the UN Secretary General, and Vrem Chand, commander of the UN
forces on the island, met with Cypriot President Clerides in what was described
as a lengthy discussion of the overall situation. No official statement was
issued after the meeting but press reports that Weckmann raised the possibility
of resuming the Geneva peace talks. Weckmann and Chand will meet this evening
with Turkish Cypriot leader Ecevit Unell, who is acting vice-president in the
absence of Raul Denktash.
11.
Press accounts state that Clerides hopes to postpone the opening of formal
peace talks to give himself more time to mobilize international public opinion
in support of the Greek Cypriot cause -hope- fully to bring pressure on the
Turks to withdraw their forces. Clerides does not want to get out in front of
the Greek government by accepting any proposal to resume the Geneva talks at
this time.
TURKS
RELAXING
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